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1 .  INTRODUCTION . 
Markets have the capacity to aggregate information held diversely by individuals. Less 
than complete information held by various individuals becomes pooled and aggregated by 
the dynamics of the price discovery process. This capacity is not perfect and it appears to 
depend upon details of market organization and the instruments that are traded. 
Nevertheless such capacity exists and motivates a broader question about the existence of 
other i nstitutions and organizations to perform this task. This study makes an inquiry 
about Parimutuel betting. Two broad questions are posed. 3 (i) Is some form of parimutuel 
betting systems capable of aggregating diverse information? This question asks for a 
"proof of principle" in the sense of a demonstration that the aggregation property can 
exist and be observed as a part of a working process. (ii) Can any success or failure of 
information aggregation be understood within the context of standard models? This 
second question reflects a requirement of "design consistency". If something works we 
would like to know if it works for theoretically understandable reasons. 
The origin of parimutuel markets lies in horse-race betting, where betters can buy tickets 
on every horse that runs the race. A parimutuel is a system of betting in which the 
winners divide the total amount bet in proportion to the amounts they bet on the winning 
horse. The word "parimutuel" comes from the French words "pari mutuel", meaning 
"wager mutual". Naturally occurring parimutuel betting systems are not designed as 
information aggregation devices. They are designed for entertainment and business 
purposes. Nevertheless, researchers have inquired about whether or not the odds that are 
endogenously determined by parimutuel betting are consistent with the relative frequency 
of winners. The data used in such studiys are typically the amounts bet at horse 
racetracks, since these data tend to be available and the rules of the process are somewhat 
transparent because of regulation and inspections. 
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3 These two questions reflect an evolving methodology for guiding research on mechanism design (see 
Plott , 1994). 
The remarkable result from the field studies of parimutuel betting is that the relative 
frequency with which horses win races is closely related to the odds that evolve 
endogenously through the betting process. Broadly summarized, this empirical literature4 
has established the existence of a clear monotone relationship between prices (odds) and 
observed relative frequencies of winning. High priced bets, the favorites that pay low 
odds, win regularly whereas low priced bets, the longshots that pay high odds, win 
occasionally. The information found revealed in naturally occurring examples is not 
perfect. A "long shot bias" exists; the odds on long shots tend to be too high, but the bias 
is not "large". 
The fundamental questions posed by this paper cannot be answernd with field data. First, 
because the mechanisms found in the field are designed as entertainment devices, as 
opposed to information aggregation tools, there are both institutions and practices (race 
rigging, off track betting, etc.) that exert themselves to complicate any analysis. 
Secondly, and more importantly ,  from the field studies it is impossible to determine if 
information aggregation is occurring. The information that is held by the individual 
agents is unknown to the scientist so the most fundamental of parameters needed for 
analysis is unknown. This parameter is unknown and probably is unknowable as a matter 
of principle. The information represented in the established odds might simply be the 
information held by a single individual or a group of individuals with identical private 
information. While data from field studies can be used to determine the accuracy of 
statistical expectations, the fundamental question about aggregation cannot be answered 
with the data. 
Thus, the data and analysis produced by the experiments reported here are the first 
evidence that has been produced regarding the questions posed. Two experimental 
studies concerning parimutuel betting do exist (Hurley and McDonough, 1 995 ; Peron and 
Smith, 1 995) but they do not address the issue of information aggregation, leaving open 
almost all questions regarding -informati.on revelation as well .  5 
From a theoretical perspective it is not obvious why the parimutuel system should 
successfully aggregate information. The odds cannot adjust independently as do market 
prices since the odds on a horse go up only if bets are placed on other horses. 
Furthermore, there is substantial opportunity for bluffing and deception by placing bets 
on horses other than the horse one expects to win. An agent with the "correct 
information", having placed a bet on the "correct horse", can then bet on the "wrong" 
horses if such betting attracts the bets of others to the wrong horses. If such deceptive 
activity does attract the bets of others to the wrong horse, it will increase the odds on the 
correct horse, resulting in the insider getting all of his/her investment back plus the bets 
4 The empirical literature , Weitzman ( 1965), Rosett ( 1965), Ali ( 1977, 1979), Snyder ( 1978), Asch, Malkiel 
and Quandt ( 1982), Thaler ( 1992), has a long history of testing various forms of the efficient market 
hypothesis . Generally speaking, it is not possible to make bets with positive expected profits after track 
commissions that amount to up to 20%. 
5 In the f irst study there are questions regarding the consistency of the overall design and the incompatibility 
of the procedures with standard experimental economics, including payments , the l imited number of real 
people, the lack of time structure in the parimutuel betting process , etc . 
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of others . Thus, intuitive support can be found for a belief that incentives exist for agents 
to place incorrect information into the system and thereby frustrate any tendency the 
system might have for information aggregation and revelation. 
Theory aside, the empirical relationships found in field studies suggest that the parimutuel 
systems found in the field might have information aggregation powers on average, and 
thus suggest the possibility of designing a parimutuel system that will perform the 
aggregation task. That is, if the motivation for the creation of the mechanism is 
information aggregation as opposed to making money, can one develop a parimutuel 
process that successfully aggregates information? The choice of institutional detail can 
draw heavily on existing systems, since the field results suggest that they might perform 
reasonably well .  Of course the institution need not mirror any particular system but can 
be developed, using such theory and intuition that is available, in an attempt to find a 
process that performs well .  
The formal structure of a parimutuel system will make its nature clear. The total tickets 
sales is shared by the holders of tickets on the winning horse, in proportion of the number 
of tickets they purchased on this winning horse. Some notation will help make the ideas 
clear. Let qu be the quantity bet by agent i on horse j and let Qj =Li qu be the total 
amount bet on horse j by all agents. Q = Lj Qj = LjLi qu is the total amount bet on all 
horses. H is the house charge (usually positive and usually a percentage rather than a 
lump charge as represented here) so the amount available for distribution is D = Q-H. 
The reported odds6 for horse j are Oj = D/Qi and the payoff to agent i is Ojqu if horse j 
wins. The question that is posed is whether or not the odds Oj carry accurate information 
about the probability that horse j will win and if this information is systematically related 
to the aggregation of the information about which horse will win that is held in 
fragmented form by the agents prior to the opening of betting.  Suppose for example that 
different agents have different information about the performance of various horses at. 
recent trials, the health of various horses, recent or likely changes in environmental 
conditions and how various horses might react, etc. This information, if pooled, could be 
a very powerful tool in predicting which horse would win a particular race. The question 
is whether or not parimutuel systems can possess that power. Is the system 
informationally efficient? 
While the general form of parimutuel betting systems is easy to understand there are 
many operational details about such systems that might influence the accuracy as an 
information aggregation process. The details of the parimutuel system that we designed 
are included as Section 2. Section 3 is a discussion of the parameters and the 
experimental design. Section 4 is a detailed discussion of the experimental procedures. 
Models that are the best candidates for capturing the behavioral nature of the dynamic and 
complex processes are reviewed and outlined in Section 5 and an appendix (Appendix D) 
contains numerical examples . No· general theory of parimutuel systems exists but such 
systems have similarities with finance. Indeed, the early field studies were motivated by 
questions about the utility functions that might exist when individuals "invest" in 
6 Odds stated at race tracks are usually reported as D/Qi -1 to 1 .  
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parimutuel alternatives . The questions that followed were whether the odds expressed 
were consistent with efficient markets. The discovery and demonstration by Plott and 
Sunder ( 1 988) that markets can aggregate diverse information leads naturally to the 
notion lhat the same, suitably modified, models and theory that suggested that financial 
markets can aggregate information could be applied to the behavior of parimutuel 
systems. Section 6 is a discussion of measures of information aggregation and numerical 
examples are in an appendix (Appendix D). Section 7 contains the results and Section 8 
is a summary of conclusions. 
A word about the context of the research is in order. An information aggregation device 
can fail in several respects . First, the processes used by individuals to process the 
information tc;J which they are exposed might not conform to Bayes ' Law. The literature 
is filled with observations that are related to the capacity of individuals to operate under 
Bayes' Law (El Gamal and Grether, 1 996) . That is, the information aggregation process 
could fail at the level of individual perceptions. Second, if individual beliefs are 
consistent with Bayes ' Law there might still be problems with their expressions of those 
beliefs. Their individual decision processes might be flawed, random or impulsive, 
reflecting lack of experience or lack of understanding about the consequences of their 
actions or the process in which they are participating (Plott, forthcoming). Third, it might 
be the case that the mechanism simply does not work as an information aggregation 
device, even under the best of circumstances . This third possibility is the focus of the 
research reported here. 
The sequential nature of the research and the data gathering process will become evident 
in the paragraphs that follow. The results are that the parimutuel process works very well 
indeed as an information aggregation device, given that the private information given to 
individuals does not rely on their ability to compute according to Bayes' Law. However, 
the aggregation process is not perfect and the reasons for the limitations are not altogether 
clear. The bulk of the analysis is a report on some of the patterns that exist in the data. 
2. PARIMUTUEL PROCESS DETAILS 
For ease of exposition the currency used will be called francs. This is the term used in the 
experiments. As will be discussed later the franc-dollar conversion rate is strictly 
controlled. While the ordinary language of parimutuels involves horses and winning 
horses, the language here is the same as was used in all experiments. The concept of a 
"state" or "market" replaces the concept of a horse and the concept of the "winning 
market" or the "state that occurred" replaces the concept of a winning horse. Thus agents 
buy tickets on states as opposed to placing bets on horses. 
A. Timing and Mechanism Termination 
jFig. l I An overview of the process is reflected in the timing of the process and is contained in 
Figure 1 .  The environments that were studied consist of a series of periods. For each 
period a state was independently chosen by "nature". The mechanism for choosing the 
4 
state and the natural probabilistic representation of the process was publicly known . 
After a state was chosen, each agent was given private information about the state. After 
this information was privately recorded, K markets were simultaneously and 
electronically opened, one for each state s .  These markets were continuous markets in the 
sense that at any instant an individual could purchase tickets in any of the markets at a 
fixed price of one franc per ticket. The individual agent could purchase tickets in lots of 
one unit or in lots of multiple units and could visit markets for purposes of purchasing as 
many times as desired, subject to the individual 's  budget constraint. 
All ticket purchases were public information. Each market showed the number of tic;kets 
it had left for sale. So, at any instant an individual could compute the number of tickets 
sold in a market and the associated odds. The process of odds computation was 
facilitated every minute with a public announcement of the odds that existed at the instant 
of the announcement. Thus, to a close approximation, individuals were aware of the odds 
continuously throughout the period when markets were open. 
The timing of markets and the process of closing markets were public information. All 
markets were simultaneously opened. Markets were open without interruption until T min 
and the time Tmin was publicly known. All markets were simultaneously closed at some 
randomly chosen instant in the interval [Tmin, Truax ] .The random process of determining 
an instant for closing was uniform over the interval and all markets closed without 
warning. 
B. States, Probabilities and Private Information 
S = { 1 ,2 , .  . . ,K} = set of K states. 
P (s ) = the probability that state s occurs. Both the notation s and the notation j will be 
used to indicate states, depending upon the context. 
Xi = the sample of data received by individual i that contains information about which 
state, s, has occurred. 
n = number of agents. 
x = { x 1 ,x2, .  • . ,Xn} = the sample of data received by all individuals. · 
P (Xi Is) = private information of individual i = the conditional probability that individual 
i receives message Xi given that the state is s. 
P (s I Xi ) = the probability that the state is s given the sample Xi computed according to 
Bayes' Law. 
P (s I x ) =  the probability that the state is s given the sample x.  
The set of states is described by S = { 1 ,2,. . . ,K}. The prior probability that state jE S is the 
state that occurs, is equal to PU) .  The individuals, denoted by the set N= { 1 ,2, .  . .  ,n} 
receive a private information signal Xi. It contains information about the state that occurs. 
The sample of all information available is denoted by x=(x 1 ,x2, .  • . ,xn) .  Private information 
is drawn from a common knowledge probability function. The conditional probability 
that better i receives information Xi, given that state s is the state that occurs, is denoted 
by P(xi Is). Given this private information, every individual can revise his prior beliefs 
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that state jE S is the state that occurs . This updated belief can be described by the 
conditional probability P(j I xi ) .  
C.  Mechanism 
The basic structure of the mechanism is as outlined in the introductory paragraphs. For 
each state/market individuals can buy tickets at a price of 1 franc each. That is, the 
tickets for all states/markets are sold at the same price. Tickets are unlimited in supply . 
Budgets were l imited. Each state had a separate market. The market that is associated 
.with the state that .occurred is.the winning market. 
T min = the minimum time that markets were open for purchases. 
Tmax = the maximum time that markets could be open for purchases. 
qu = the quantity of tickets that individual i purchases in the state j market. Since each 
ticket is priced at 1 it is also the total number of francs spent by individual i in market j. 
qi = (qil, qi2, . .. , qiK) = vector with the quantity of tickets i purchases in each market. 
Qj = Li qu = the total amount of tickets purchased by all individuals in the market for 
state j. 
Q = Lj Qj = LjLi qij is the total amount purchased by all individuals in all markets . 
H = the house charge/bonus. In parimutuels found in the field this is positive (a charge) 
but in the mechanism studied here it is negative (a bonus) for reasons that will be 
explained in sections following. 
D = Q - H is the amount of money available for distribution to the winners by the 
parimutuel mechanism. 
Oj = DI Qj = the payoff odds for state j given the purchase decisions represented by Q, 
and Qj and the house charge/bonus H. That is, for each ticket that the individual possesses 
in market j, her or she will receive a payoff of Oj if state j occurs. 
Pj = Q/Q = the implicit price for state j. It is the proportion of tickets sold ("bets placed") 
for state j. 
Wi = (Oj - 1 )  qu = profits (winnings) in francs for individual i if the state is j. 
D. Individual Utility Functions and Constraints 
mi = the number of units of the medium of exchange (money) held by individual i .  
Ui(s, mi)= Ui(mi) = the utility function of individual i . It i s  assumed that individuals care 
only about monetary holdings and not the particular state. Procedures to induce this 
property are applied in the environments that are studied. 
Mi = the budget constraint for individual i. The individual can spend no more than Mi in 
the parimutuel process. As will be explained in the parameter section each individual had 
an endowment of cash, Ei , and a loan, Li, that had to be repaid to the experimenter. 
Mi=Ei+Li. 
Ls qis �Mi the spending of individual i in all markets is limited by the agent's budget 
constraint. 
After market closure, better i receives a profit Wi = qisOs - Lj qu + Ei if market s 
represents the chosen state. 
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3. PARAMETERS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The choice of parameters and the experimental design, summarized in Table 1 ,  reflects 
the design and exploratory objectives of the research. In total, four different sets of 
parameters were used in seven associated experiments including the "pilot". In Table 1 
the seven experimental sessions are indexed according to the date of the experiment 
beginning with the pilot experiment 1 1 1 995 . The state, and the information held by 
individual agents, could possibly differ each period, so each period confronted the 
parimutuel system with a possibly different information aggregation problem. The 
combination of the six experiments with the parimutuel process provided an opportunity 
to gather much data. In total the decisions of 85 subjects in 1 08 periods (excluding 
practice periods) were observed and studied. 
The capacity of the parimutuel system to aggregate information was completely unknown 
at the time of the design, and models that might have been applied to anticipate what 
would happen are substantially incomplete. Thus, the data gathering started with a single 
pilot experiment in a very simple, three state environment that is known to cause 
aggregation problems in similar informational environments in the context of asset 
markets (Plott and Sunder, 1 988). The experiments that followed the pilot were 
designed conditional on what was observed in the pilot and these subsequent experiments 
began to constitute a type of "stress test" of the mechanism that increased in difficulty as 
more information about the behavior of the process was acquired. For example, the last 
periods of the early experiments used the parameters that were planned for possible use in 
the next experiment. As can be seen in the table, the parameters begin with what might 
be thought of as the "easiest" of the cases studied, and then, as successful aggregation is 
observed, subsequent parameter choices become "harder". The easiest conditions are 
called the NOT SETS condition and the harder conditions are called the Probabilistic 
Information Condition (PIC). 
A. States and Information 
The pilot experiment ( 1 1 1 995) had three states for the initial three periods (periods 0, 1 ,2) 
and six states for the other periods. Had information aggregation not been observed in 
the first three periods, the design called for other periods to have three states. In this three 
state environment, the aggregation was clear so the subsequent periods involved six states 
The results of the three state periods are not used for further analysis. 
States were given names. In the three-state environment the states were names SX, SY, 
and SZ. In the six-state environment the names of states also consisted of two letters. The 
first letter was one of {S,T} and the second letter was one of { X,Y,Z}. 
In all cases the state was drawn with a uniform distribution over states. Two different 
private information conditions were studied. In the NOT SETS condition, agents were 
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individually given information about states that did NOT occur. The privately held 
information was such that the state that occurred could be deduced with certainty, from 
pooled private information. Thus, in the NOT SETS condition the "system" knew with 
certainty the state that occurred, but no individual knew the state with certainty. 
Specifically, in the NOT SETS condition for the six-state cases, (experiment 1 1 1 995, 
periods 3 thru 8; experiments 1 12995 and 1 1 3095, periods 0 thru 1 6), each period the 
agents were randomly partitioned into three equal-sized groups. One group received 
information that allowed it to eliminate one of the letters S or T, depending on the state 
that occurred. The other two groups each received information that allowed them to 
eliminate one of the letters X,Y, or Z. Suppose for example that the state that occurred 
was SY. Then one-third of the agents knew NOT T, one third knew NOT X and one third 
knew NOT Z. Collectively the agents knew the state that occurred, but no one knew the 
state with certainty.7 · 
In the Probabilistic Information Condition (PIC), experiments 1 1 2995 and 1 1 3095 
(periods 1 7  and 1 8), experiments 1 2 1 595, 061 896A, 06 1 896B,  and 06 1 996 (periods 0 
thru 1 6), private information was given as a sample and a computed conditional 
probability of the state given the sample. The sample consisted of three independent 
draws with replacement, taken from an urn with the probability of the correct state equal 
to one third (five fifteenths) and the probability of each of the five other states equal to 
two fifteenths. Both the actual draws and the conditional probability (calculated by 
Bayes' Law) that each state would be the state that occurred, were given as private 
information. 
Formally stated, with the Probabilistic Information Condition (PIC), each agent, i, saw a 
sample of three draws from a multinomial distribution. For ease of exposition, let xu be 
the number of times the state j occurred in i ' s  sample, so the sample seen by any agent i 
can be represented by the vector Xi = (xi 11Xj2,xi3,Xi4,Xis,xi6) , where XijE { 0, 1 ,2,3 } and 
I, 6 Xij =3.  That is, given that the state that occurs is s, the information Xi is drawn from 
J=I 
the multinomial distribution: 
where Ps's = the probabil ity that a single draw will be the state s' when the actual state that 
occurs is s can be written as 
{ II 3 ifs'= s 
ps-, 
= 
2 / 15 if s'=F s 
7 The "NOT SETS" information in the three-states periods ( 1 1 1995) , periods 0 thru 2, was similar. In the 
three-state case, the state was one of the letters X,Y, or Z. If , for example the state was X then a randomly 
chosen half of the agents received the information NOT Y and the other half received the information NOT 
Z. Thus , collectively the state was known but no individual knew the state . 
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In addition to the sample, the individual was given the probability, computed by 
application of Bayes' Law, of each state being the state that occurred given the particular 
sample that the individual drew. That is, for each state s, each individual agent was given 
the number that resulted from the evaluation of the function 
Consider an example of the Probabilistic Information Condition (PIC) . Suppose the 
resulting state SX was the actual state and that the sample drawn by agent i was {TY, SX, 
SZ} .  The individual would then be given the sample { SX, SY, SZ, TX, TY, TZ} = { 1 ,  0, 
1 ,  0, 1 ,  O} and the vector of posterior probabilities {0.238 ;  0.095 ; 0.238; 0.095; 0.238; 
0.095 } indicating the probability of each of the six states given the agent 's  private 
information and the prior probabilities of the states. 
The actual computations of Bayes' Law were given in order to control for possible bias 
and errors at the first instance of the information aggregation process .  The questions 
posed by the research focused primarily on the ability of the process to aggregate 
information held at the individual level. If the experiment did not effectively control the 
information at the individual level then a problem would remain to determine if the errors 
of the aggregation mechanism were due to contamination (from the point of view of 
modeling) at the initial step of the process. While this procedure does not completely 
guarantee the elimination of biases, it reflects an attempt to reduce them. 
All parameters were chosen after a review of the consequences for the aggregate 
information that the mechanism would be processing. For example, in the PIC a sample 
of three under the conditional probabilities ( 1/3 for the state that occurs and 2/1 5 for each 
of the five others) might seem to be very little at the individual level of analysis, but the 
distribution formed by the pooling of all agents' information, when there are from ten to 
fifteen individuals, can be very peaked at one state. In other words, the choice of 
parameters was such as to make the variance high at the individual level, so the individual 
had much to learn from the process, and yet make the variance small at the aggregate 
level in order to facilitate clear predictions. Of course, depending upon the samples 
drawn, it is always possible that in some periods more than one state has a high 
l ikelihood. 
B .  Endowments, Loans and H. 
The choice of endowments and loans was based on incentives and common experimental 
practices. Each period, each individual was given an endowment E of one hundred units 
of house money which translated into one dollar. Recall that it is possible for individuals 
to lose money in a parimutuel process and this endowment provided a base that would 
help prevent bankruptcies. The agent was paid the endowment of one dollar whether or 
not he or she participated. The loan L of three hundred units money gave agents an 
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opportunity to buy beyond their endowment, while placing an overall budget constraint 
on their exposure to bankruptcy. The total budget M is equal to the sum of E and L. The 
individuals could lose (a real loss) no more than L - E in a single period or the individual 
could guarantee an income of E per period by doing nothing. 
The house charge/bonus, H, was negative. That is, H was a bonus paid by the house ($1 2, 
$1 5 ,  or $ 10, depending upon the number of subjects) rather than a "tax" so, unlike the 
examples of parimutuels found in the field, which operate for profit, the mechanism we 
created lost money for the house. This transformed the lotteries from ones that had 
negative expectation of earnings to lotteries that had positive expectation and thus gave 
all individuals who might be risk averse some incentive to invest in tickets. If the 
expectation had been negative due to a house "cut", then risk-averse individuals with 
private information may have had no incentive to participate. As a result their private 
information would never be reflected in the behavior of the system. 
C. Time, Timing and Mechanism Termination 
The importance of the termination of a mechanism is well known. Incentives to wait in 
order to get information while giving none, frequently exist in mechanisms where conflict 
of interest is present. A random stopping rule was employed to help overcome the 
problem. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated in experiments . In many senses, due to 
the timing and processing of bets ( the lines of people at betting windows, etc.), random 
stopping rules might effectively exist in parimutuels found in the field. 
In all periods of all experiments the markets operated for a maximum of five minutes 
(Tmax=5). The minimum length of time that markets were open, Tmin , differed across 
experiments. In the NOT SETS condition the minimum length of time that the markets 
were open, was four minutes (Tmin=4). In the first set of experiments under PIC the 
markets were open for at least four minutes (Tmin=4). In the second set of experiments 
under PIC this minimum possible was reduced to two minutes (Tmin=2) . The former 
condition is called the PIC-4, the latter is PIC-2. The reason for decreasing this minimum 
time was due to the imperfect aggregation property observed in the PIC-4 condition, as 
will be shown later. In the PIC-4 design, the one minute period between minimum and 
maximum time appeared to be short relative to the pace of market activity. On average 
this period lasts only half a minute. It was thought that early terminations might have 




A. Subjects and Recruiting 
Subjects were Caltech undergraduates and graduates. Most of the subjects were familiar 
with the computer technology as a result of previous market experiments, but many were 
completely inexperienced with the actual experiment. Recruiting was done through 
internet e-mail .  Subjects in 1 12995 were completely inexperienced. The second 
experiment, 1 1 2995, used a mix of experienced and inexperienced agents as did 
experiment 1 1 3095 . The fourth experiment, 1 2 1 595, used all inexperienced agents. 
Experiment 06 l 896A and 061 896B contained mostly inexperienced subjects. Finally, the 
subjects in 06 1 996 were recruited from experiments 061 896A and 061 896B. Thus, o.nly 
in 06 1 996 all subjects were experienced with the actual experiment. The number of 
agents varied across experiments according to the availability of subjects. 
B .  Instructions, Chalkboard and Training 
Subjects were given the written instructions contained in Appendix A. These instructions 
were read to the subject with the aid of the presentations on the chalkboard. After the 
instructions were read and questions were answered the markets were open for a period 0 
which was only a practice session in which no real money was involved. This practice 
session used all of the methods of purchasing, announcements, etc. of the actual 
parimutuel that was employed, except for the fact that no real payments were involved. 
C. Technology: Information 
Because of the need to distribute private information with the appropriately calculated 
posterior probabilities the events and samples were pre-drawn .  This fact of pre-drawn 
states and samples was public information. Subjects were told that the states were drawn 
using a random number table that could be inspected by anyone after the experiment. 
None of the subjects asked to inspect the table. 
Private information for the appropriate number of agents was written on slips of paper 
and put into a box each period. The experimenter walked around 'the room and allowed 
each subject to draw a slip, without looking, from the box. The form of the slip is in 
Appendix B. With NOT SETS conditions, this slip indicated a state which did not occur. 
In the Probabilistic Information Condition, it contained for each state the number of times 
the state was drawn in a sample from the urn and also the posterior probability of each 
state being the state that occurred given the sample. The subjects recorded that 
information in the appropriate place on their record sheet, as shown in the Appendix . 
These procedures were used for all periods of all experiments . 
D. Technology : Markets and Feedback Information 
1 1  
The software generally available for the multiple unit double auction (MUDA) was 
adapted to become a parimutuel system. A separate market was opened for each state and 
the experimenter offered a fixed quantity of "tickets" for sale at 1 franc each. The 
quantity for sale, which exceeded the maximum that could possibly be purchased by the 
group, was displayed on each subject's computer screen. Individual agents, buyers, were 
free to toggle among markets and make purchases as they wished in real time. As agents 
purchased tickets, the quantity offered for sale was reduced by the amount of the sale, so 
the difference between the initial quantity offered and the post-purchase quantity 
remaining at the moment was a measure of the total number of tickets purchased. Thus 
agents had instanta.neous access to the number of tickets purchas�d and thus had instantaneous access to the odds. 
Periodically the experimenter announced the odds that existed at the moment using an 
overhead projector. This calculation of odds required the manual entry of ticket sales 
from all markets into a computer attached to the overhead. The resulting computation 
and projection by overhead required a few seconds, so odds were precisely computed and 
made available only with some small delays. 
The times T min and T max were announced by the experimenter in advance. When the 
time Tmin passed the experimenter made a second announcement so subjects were aware 
that the end would be randomly determined from then on. A clock on each agent' s  
computer gave the agent continuous access to time. The period was closed randomly 
without warning. The experimenter had randomly chosen a second at which the 
experiment should stop. When this second arrived the experimenter pressed a computer 
key that closed the period instantaneously. 
When the period ended the state was announced and written on the chalkboard. The final 
odds paid on the state were announced. Each agent calculated earning? (positive or 
negative) for the period. At the beginning of the next period, information for the next 
period was drawn from the box by each agent and markets were opened for the purchase 
of tickets. 
5. MODELS 
The fundamental questions posed by the research are: does information aggregation take 
place and if so, what is the process through which it happens. In order to answer such 
questions, several different concepts are needed. First, in Section A, the information 
possessed by individuals and by the market as a whole are described. Second, in order to 
address the nature of aggregation, several different classes of behavioral models are 
reviewed in Sections B through D. These models are based on different principles of 
individual perceptions and behavior, ranging from theories that have individuals behaving 
myopically, having no response to the presence of others, to theories that have individuals 
nearly clairvoyant about what others will do. Some of the predictions of these models are 
in Table 2. Appendix D contains a numerical example. 
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A. Information 
Two concepts of information are used in the development of all of the models and 
measurement methods. The first measure is related to the information given to 
individuals and is a parameter of many of the models. 
(i) Private Information. As was discussed above, the nature of the private information 
differed across experiments. In the NOT SETS condition the private information was 
PU I Xi ) = 1 /Ki where Ki is the number of states not eliminated by i ' s  private information 
and j was not eliminated. In the Probabilistic Information Condition (PIC) the 
information was given as a draw from an urn conditional upon the state and in terms of 
the probabil ities given in equation (2) in Section 3 above. 
(ii) Aggregate Information Available CAIA). This measure is obtained by the pooling of 
all i nformation given to individuals .  It is the best information that exists in the system 
concerning the state. It can be represented by the conditional probability PU I x ). In the 
NOT SETS condition, the AIA was a signal that correctly pointed to the state that 
occurred. In the PIC, the fact of independence in the draws could create, by aggregation, a 
strong signal that put most probability mass on the state that occurred. The aggregated 
posterior probabilities can be computed according to the formula ( 3 ), where the number 
of times that state j appears across all n individual agents ' draws is 
j - "'II • ' - 1 2 6 X L..J;=J Xu , J - , , . . . , , 
and, accordingly, the posterior probability that j is the state that occurs, given the 
aggregate of information distributed to all individuals is: 
· 
I r1 r2 r1 r4 r5 r6 6 1 2 1 .i 5 6 ( 3 )  AIA = PU x) =p· p· p· p· p· p· I LP1',.p2.1,.p;'.p�,.p�_.p:" I j 2 j 3 j 4 j 5 j 6 j s'"i . " . . .. " 
B.  Private Information Models 
The models in the section above are related to concepts of information. The discussion 
now turns to behavior. Two models considered tend to rest on the principles of 
optimization at the level of individual choice. However, the information used in 
individual choices does not go beyond the private information that the individual has. The 
models rely on the principle that individuals learn nothing about the state that occurs from 
the actions of other individuals. The difference between the two models is the response to 
market prices. 
Decision Theory Private Information (DTPI). The individual chooses the market that 
yields the highest expected returns, given private information and given a belief that the 
return is the same for all markets. It is as if the individual must decide how to invest 
before observing any implicit prices. The model allows neither learning nor strategic 
behavior. 
1 3 
Competitive Equilibrium Private Information (CEPI). The competitive equilibrium is 
calculated according to the principle that all agents take market prices as constants. 
Market price in the context of the parimutuel betting system is taken as the odds. The 
prices are those that equate quantity of tickets supplied with the quantity of tickets 
demanded. In the case of CEPI the information on which individual demand is based is 
the private information. The optimization problem is that the agent maximize conditional 
expected utility, given private information. That is, from an agent perspective, the 
decision problem this agent has to solve is to maximize expected profit subject to 
constraint, and can be written as, 
��x{E[q;sOs - � q; +Bi j xi]} 
K 
s.t. I.qu � M. 
j=l 
In the NOT SETS condition, in which the private information consists of a set of states 




where Xi={j E SI in state j is not eliminated by the private information i received} and Ki 
is the number of states this set (the number of those that are not eliminated by i ' s  private 
information). The solution to this problem is an individual demand correspondence, as a 
function of the odds 0=(01 , .  . .,0K), 
otherwise 
for jE Xi, and, 
qu(O) = 0, 
for j�Xi, and additionally, 
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±qu(O) = M 3j E x, oj > 1, K; j=I 
K 
Lqu(O) � M j=I 
otherwise 
In words, this correspondence can be described as putting one's money at a not­
eliminated market with the highest odds. Additionally, these odds have to be large 
enough with respect to i ' s  private posterior probabilities. The Walrasian equilibrium 
condition implies that, 
11 K 
LLqik(O)-H 
0 i=I k=I • 1 K j=��ll----,1 = ,. . . ,  . 
Lqu(O) i=I 
Proposition. For the NOT SETS condition it can be shown that for the CEPI model : 
(i) the implicit prices satisfy, 
I I I P=(P1, P2,. . ., PK) = (-,-,. . .,-) ; 
K K K 
(ii) the total volume is equal to the sum of the budgets; 
(iii) the distribution of profits depends on the distribution of tickets in equilibrium. 
Proof. Existence and uniqueness can be found in Eisenberg and Gale ( 1 959). Hence, it 
suffices to check whether the given odds vector (the implicit price vector) satisfies the 
equilibrium conditions. For this odds (price) vector, all individuals are indifferent 
between tickets at markets which are not eliminated by their private information. 
Consequently, it is easy to construct a vector of allocations that satisfy the Walrasian 
equilibrium condition and distributes tickets to individuals at markets that are not 
eliminated by their private information. 
The analysis above is restricted to the case in which private information is of the special 
form in which some subset of states can be eliminated with certainty . For the PIC the 
Eisenberg and Gale analysis applies to establish existence. So, existence is not a problem 
but closed form solutions are not generally possible in the PIC. However, it is possible to 
compute the equilibrium prices by using numerical fixed-point algorithms (Van der Laan 
and Seel en, 1984 ). For the parameters of the experiment such calculations were made 
and are presented as part of the results. 
C. Models with Updated Beliefs 
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The second class of models relies on a principle that behavior is based on beliefs that are 
consistent with experience. The first model is not game theoretic in nature. The second 
model involves deeper postulates about the nature of the process through which 
information about others is transmitted. 
Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations (CERE). This model is used as a 
benchmark as opposed to adding postulates about individual behavior. In this model 
prices, (odds), are taken as constants from the point of view of the individual agent. The 
postulate at the foundation of the model is that the prices are perfectly revealing and are 
thus distributed according to AIA. That is, according to this model, the implicit prices 
will seek an equilibrium in which all available information has been integrated into the 
prices. 
Existence of such a price vector is not a problem. Since the expected values are constant, 
in a risk neutral world, all agents exhaust their budgets. The expected value of all 
markets would be the same given the equilibrium odds so individuals would be 
indifferent among the markets. Thus, the model makes no unique predictions about 
quantities held in relation to the private information as long as the allocation satisfies the 
system constraints. All agents should be equally profitable. 
The common drawback of market models like the competitive equilibrium private 
information model and the rational expectations model lies in the fact that it postulates 
the assumption that agents consider the price as a fixed quantity, independent of one's 
actions. This assumption is questionable, as i t  does not explain the origin of the price, and 
furthermore, it is difficult to maintain in markets with a small number of traders . 
Therefore the assumption that the price is fixed is discarded and the following model is 
introduced. 
Bayesian Games. Full game theoretic models of the information and strategic 
p.ossibilities are not fully developed. In this subsection the process is described as a 
Bayesian game, .in which every agent simultaneously has to decide how many tickets he 
would like to purchase at each market. That is, a strategy profile q *=( q 1 * ,q2 *, .  . . ,q0 *) is a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if every risk-neutral agent with private information Xi 
maximizes his expected profit, 
11 K 
I Iqkj- H , 
* k=lj=I K * qi Eargmax E[q;s ,, - Iqu + Elq. = q ,x.] 
'1,· " q j=I -1 -1 J £.., ks k=I 
and satisfies his budget constraint 
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In the NOT SETS condition, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in which all agents will 
follow what will be called the proportional allocation strategy. That is, they will equally 
divide their budget over the markets that are not excluded by their private information. ,  
i .e .  
for jE Xi, and, 
M qij=­K; 
qu=O, 
for jE Xi. This result can easily be extended to a multi-stage game, where at each stage 
agents can decide how many tickets they would like to purchase at the markets, and each 
agent is informed about all the tickets sales at the end of each stage. In this multi-stage 
game, an equilibrium strategy is one in which each agent purchases tickets at the last 
stage, identical to the strategy described in the one-stage game. 
Agents will divide their budget across states in proportion to the relative probability of 
the state in their private information. The normalized price for each state j is given by 
1 /n:L '.' P(j I xi) . The volume is equal to the sum of the budgets. The profits are equally 
1=1 
distributed in the situation with three markets, but show heterogeneity in the 6 markets 
environment. Agents who can exclude more states by their information, possess an 
informational advantage that results in higher profits. 
In Probabilistic Information Conditions (PIC), we did not succeed in finding the 
equilibria in this game. 
D. Herding Behavior: (Excessive Use of Market Data) 
The class consists of a single model that is based on the principle that individuals simply 
ignore their own information and mimic others completely. The idea is more qualitative 
than the models considered above. While within the finance literature8, different kinds of 
models are used to explain herding behavior, the basic idea here is that agents base their 
actions solely on the information the market reveals, as the signal provided by the market 
is stronger than their private information. Related to a parimutuel setting, in which there 
is only one market that pays, a prediction of this model is that (a subset of) traders "jump" 
too impulsively at a market. Broadly speaking, the herding model would predict lots of 
action in one particular market, i .e. the implicit price of one of the markets is fairly high. 
Which market receives all of the action depends on the initial actions taken in the markets 
and may be unrelated to the actual state that has occurred or the privately held 
information about states . 
8 see e.g . Scharfstein and Stein ( 1990), Welch ( 1992). 
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6. BASELINE MEASURES OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION 
The major variables of interest are the implicit prices and the information that they 
contain. In this section three questions about information measurement are answered. 
How is the level of information in the prices measured? How does one compare levels of 
information in different patterns of prices? What baselines are used as the background 
against which information aggregation measurements can be made? Appendix D 
contains numerical examples of the concepts used in this section and in the section above. 
In the finance l iterature the classical methodology of assessing il)formation aggregation 
relies on concepts of market efficiency. The question is whether or not markets are 
"efficient" in the incorporation of information in the sense that no one is able to make a 
profit from information contained in prices. Two related concepts of efficiency have been 
posed. 
Weak statistical efficiency: This form of efficiency demands that there are no obvious 
trading rules that significantly outperform the average. Operationally speaking, the 
parimutuel market is weakly efficient if there are no obvious filter rules that make 
significant returns. 
Strong statistical efficiency: The market is strongly efficient if insiders do not make 
significantly higher returns than noninsiders. 
Direct measurement of information aggregation is generally not possible in the field of 
finance because the information held privately is not observable. This can lead to 
misinterpretations of the results. For example, Plott and Sunder ( 1 988) found that a 
market can have the property of weak statistical efficiency even though the information 
that exists to be aggregated in the market is not aggregated into price �t all .  
Since experimental methods have been utilized in  this study, better measurement methods 
can be employed. Measures of the degree of aggregation involve comparisons of 
distributions. In the evaluation of information aggregation it will be necessary to adopt 
conventions for determining when one distribution, p, is close in information content to 
another distribution, q. Two different conventions present themselves . If the discrete 
distributions are described by their probability density functions {pd i=l..K and {qi} i=l..K 
respectively, then the measure proposed by Wurtz ( 1 996)9 can be written as 
K 
W(p,q) = OSL:lp;-q;I 
i=l 
whereas the Kullback-Leibler measure (Kullback and Leibler, 1 952) is described by 
9 This measure is proportional to the average absolute prediction error , as used by Berg, Forsythe and Rietz 
( 1995) to examine the efficiency of their political stock market. 
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K K(p,q) = 2Jog(p;f q;)p; 
i=1 
The next important ingredient of information aggregation measurement is the baseline. 
What does it mean for "no aggregation" to have occurred? Against what base do we want 
aggregation to be measured? Four different measurements are listed. Three of these are 
directly related to the models described in the previous section. The fourth is added as a 
type of boundary for the support of the private information. Since each of these measures 
can represent a probability distribution, they are called "opinions". In the measurements . 
of information aggregation the q-distribution will be the Aggregate Information Available 
(AIA), used as a benchmark against which the p-distribution, the implicit prices, and the 
baselines given below, will be compared to determine the "distance" of the chosen 
baseline from "pe1fect" aggregation. 
(i) . Decision Theory Private Information (DTP/) Opinion 
On the one hand, this opinion would be obtained if all subjects answered the question 
"which state is most likely to occur" and the average (mean) of those opinions was 
calculated. On the other hand it is the Decision Theory Private Information model 
equilibrium price pattern. Since it reflects a type of myopic decision making, it could be 
viewed as a base against which aggregation could be measured. 
(ii). The Competitive Equilibrium Private Information (CEPI) Opinion 
If individuals make decisions only on their own private information and if the markets 
work competitively, then this is the price pattern that would emerge. The competitive 
model does force some type of merging of information, as reflected in price. However, 
since it involves no explicit information aggregation as part of the behavior of the model, 
it is an alternative baseline. 
(iii) .  Average Opinion. 
If subjects truthfully reveal their private posterior distribution, this opinion would be 
reached by averaging those private opinions. If odds reflect this type of aggregation then 
prices are distributed according to the average information that is held privately. That is, 
the normalized price for each state j is given by 1 /n Li'.' P(j I Xi) . This is the price pattern 1=! 
that results from the proportional allocation predicted by the Bayesian game in the NOT 
SETS condition. Since it is a natural measure it will be used in the PIC as well . 
(iv). Best Opinion. 
This opinion is constructed by taking the posterior distribution of the best informed 
individual, i .e. the individual whose private posterior distribution is closest to the 
aggregate information available. In a sense, it is part of the support for the distributions 
of private information. It represents the distribution that is "closest" to the truth that 
might be the result of aggregation. Information that is better than this measure has 





Before the results on aggregate level are described, we think it might be useful to consider 
the results of a few typical periods. Figure 2-A,B and Figure 3-A,B provide a qualitative 
representation of the data. Shown in each panel A is the total amount of money bet in the 
six markets . These lines are represented as cumulations of spending in the sense that if 
l ine x is above l ine y, the distance from line x to line y is the investment in market x .  The 
B panels are perhaps more informative because these show the bets in each market as a 
percentage of all bets in all markets, the implicit prices that are discovered in the markets . 
The vertical line seen at 4/5 the distance of the time scale represents the minimum time 
for which the markets are open, after which the markets all close at a randomly chosen 
time within the next minute. 
Figure 2-A,B shows the time-series of ticket purchases of market period 1 1  in experiment 
1 1 2995, whereas Figure 3-A,B gives similar results for the same period in experiment 
1 1 3095 .  Both of these experiments have a NOT SETS information strncture. In the 
1 1 2995 experiment, state TY was the state that occurred, whereas in the 1 1 3095 
experiment, the state SZ occurred. 
The A-panels tell us that absolute volume was relatively small during the minutes before 
the time T min· In the last seconds before this point in time, market volume suddenly 
started rising. Most of the ticket sales were realized in this small time interval. As can be 
seen in the B-panels, early in the market the relative betting wandered across all markets 
until time was near the vertical line. As the minimum time approached the betting 
became heavier in a few markets and then, one market began to emerge as the one that is 
clearly attracting the most bets. In period 1 1  of experiment 1 1 2995 (Figure 2-B) ,  the 
market that emerged with the highest price was indeed the winning market. The prices of 
the other states fell .  Thus, for this period the state that occurred was the market with the 
highest price and the winner was thereby revealed by price. Of course, if the prices were 
perfectly revealing of the information then the prices of each state would be equal to the 
probability that the state occurs, according to the aggregated private information. The 
price of the winning market was short of the actual probability (probability = 1 )  and the 
prices of the other states were "close" but not exactly equal to zero. In Figure 2-A it is 
observed that in this period ticket sales hardly occurred after the fast emergence in one 
market, or when the volume is close to the maximum level of spending. 
In Figure 3-B , period 1 1  of experiment 1 1 3095, a different story can be told. In this 
period one observes a so-called bubble in the sense that the market that emerges is not 
associated with the state that occurs. Whereas SZ was the state that occurs, the emerging 
market was market SX. However, contrary to the previous figure, in this period a lot of 
action was still going on after the emergence. Traders who received an information slip 
that told them to exclude market X from the possible winners, were fully aware of the fact 
that a bubble was occurring. These subjects knew that the tickets sales spent in the SX 
market would be lost to those that have invested in the right market. The adjustment 
patterns initiated by these subjects can explain the drop in the price of SX just after T min · 
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Now, a more formal discussion of the results is presented. The discussion is partitioned 
into several subsections, in which the questions formulated in the previous sections will 
be explored. 
A. Statistical Efficiency Measures 
The weakest form of efficiency demands that there are no obvious trading rules with 
returns that significantly outperform average returns. Following previous studies in 
parimutuel betting, the trading rule examined is. one which uses the ranking of the horses 
by the market, e.g. a rule which allocates one's budget to the market with the highest 
implicit price. 
RESULT I .  The parimutuel markets exhibit weak statistical efficiency under both sets 
of information conditions, NOT SETS and PIC. 
SUPPORT. A ticket' s price in a market is the implicit price. For each period of each 
experiment, markets are ranked by the implicit prices that existed at the close of the 
period. The market with the highest implicit price is called the I st, the market with the 
next highest implicit price is called the 2nd, and so on. The average implicit price is 
computed for each rank and the relative frequency of winning is computed for each rank. 
Table 3 contains the computations. That is, the average implicit price of the 1 st, 
computed across all periods for the NOT SETS experiments, is 0.744 and the relative 
frequency with which the l st actually won in these experiments was 0.763. In Table 4 the 
numbers are computed for the probabilistic cases. In the PIC the implicit price for the I st 
is, on average, 0.536 and the 1 st wins 0.588 percent of the periods, etc. 
In a weakly efficient market, implicit prices and expected returns 10 should be equal . The 
parimutuel markets exhibit weak statistical efficiency for both the NOT SETS and the 
PIC. 1 1  • For both sets of data a strong relationship exists between the average implicit 
prices given the rank of a market and the probability of winning. In empirical terms, 
these results suggest that all information has been aggregated in implicit prices. 
Weak statistical efficiency means that "outsiders", those who have only price 
information, cannot make extraordinary profits. Having established that from an outsider 
point of view it is not possible to make significantly higher returns, the question remains 
whether this is possible for an insider. Insiders are defined as those agents who receive 
1 0  A ticket's return in a market, j is related to the objective winning probability of the market j. This 
probability is defined to be the proportion of times the market is the winning market, as the game is 
repeated an infinitely large number of times. If there are finite number of games played by the subjects, this 
probability can be estimated by the average number of periods that market j is the winning market. 
1 1  Consider a chi-square test of the form L, �=I ( WM j - TP j) 2 / TP j) . WMi is the number of per iods 
that marke t j is the winning market; T is the number of periods (observations) ; Pi is the average implici t 
price for market j . For X2i-I , the statistic is 1 .084 for the NOT SETS and 2. 176 for the probabilistic. In both 
cases weak efficiency of the markets cannot be rejected. Additionally, the results of a t-test (Ali, 1977) do 
not reject weak statistical efficiency, as can be read in Table 3 and Table 4. 
2 1  
· information that assigns the highest posterior probability to the event that the state that 
occurs is the true state (which is unknown for the insider, but known to the experimenter) . 
Strong statistical efficiency means that insiders cannot make significantly higher returns 
than outsiders or cannot make significantly higher returns than other insiders who might 
have different information. 
RESULT 2. Strong statistical efficiency means that there should be no relationship 
between private information and profits. Strong statistical efficiency is present in the 
NOT SETS conditions but it is not present in the PIC. 
SUPPORT. The relation between profits , Wi, and inside information, P(s I Xi), can be 
examined by the linear model, 
The error-term Ei is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cr2, and all .errors are 
independent. The constant <Xi is individual-specific to allow for individual differences 
among betters. 1 2 Estimation results can be read in Table 5. In both information structures, 
it can be observed from the estimated coefficient, �. that the relationship between the 
quality of information and profits is positive. In the NOT SETS condition, this 
relationship is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 5% level, whereas it is 
significantly different from zero in the PIC. This leads to the conclusion that in the PIC, 
strong efficiency is rejected, whereas in the NOT SETS condition even strong efficiency 
can be upheld. 13  
The second result suggests that decisions about which market to buy have a substantial 
variance across individuals in the PIC. Such differences in investments can be interpreted 
as differences in individual opinions about expected values, possibly reflecting some 
incompleteness in information aggregation. If the information is perfectly aggregated 
then there should be no differences of opinion. In the NOT SETS condition there is little 
difference in decisions, reflecting the theory that all information had become public. 
A surprisingly strong similarity exists between the efficiency results and data obtained in 
the field from racetrack parimutuel betting. On one hand, the correlation between the 
implicit price and the objective winning probability is very high, especially in the NOT 
SETS information structure. This weak form of statistical efficiency is reported 
frequently in field studies. On the other hand, a well known bias that exists in the field is 
also present in the experimental data. 
OBSERVATION 1 .  The 'favorite/longshot' biases are present in the data; although, the 
biases are less pronounced in the experimental data than in field data. 
1 2  This analysis ignores the fact that within one period subjects ' profits are correlated, as the sum of the 
profits is always equal to -H. 
13 It should be noted that this result might be due to the small difference in information advantage between 
a�ents . 
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Notice from Tables 3 and 4, that the implicit prices of the 1 st are slightly too low, relative 
to the frequency of winning, and the implicit prices of the 6th are slightly too high. This 
means that the longshot has been overvalued, whereas the favorite has been undervalued. 
The slight nature of the effect can be seen by observing, for example, that in the NOT 
SETS condition, the effect goes away if the three top-ranked markets are considered. 
B .  Measures of information aggregation in prices 
The statistical measure of efficiency cannot be used to measure information aggregation. 
Information aggregation is the relationship among information held at the individual . level 
and information reflected in prices . Any measure of aggregation must be based on the 
information that exists to be aggregated. For example, a premature conclusion derived 
from the results in the previous section would suggest that the parimutuel mechanism, 
especially in the NOT SETS condition, did an effective job of aggregation. Such a 
conclusion would be premature because the statistical efficiency measures do not 
incorporate the nature of the information that exists to be aggregated and therefore cannot 
measure the amount that takes place. Furthermore, conclusions reached by using 
statistical efficiency measures make sense only on average. They do not provide 
arguments that for every market period information has been aggregated. 
RESULT 3 .  Information aggregation has clearly taken place in the NOT SETS condition. 
Whether or not information aggregation has taken place in the PIC cases depends upon 
the choice of baseline. If either the Competitive Equilibrium Private Information Opinion 
or the Average Opinion is used as the baseline, then one can conclude that aggregation 
has also taken place in the PIC case. 
SUPPORT. Tables 6 and 7 contain the distance from AIA to each of the four baseline 
measures as well as the implicit prices reflected in the final odds. The Wurtz measure is 
used for both sets of experiments, whereas the Kullback-Leibler measure can only be 
computed for the PIC parameters. Thus, Tables 6 and 7 provide measures of the average 
degree of aggregation of the information that took place in the markets . 
For the NOT SETS condition, the information measure based on implicit prices is at least 
two times smaller than the ones based on any of the proposed baselines. For example, the 
average Wurtz distance from AIA to the Average Opinion is 0. 722, while the Wurtz 
distance from AIA to the implicit prices derived from the final odds is 0 .33 1 .  In this case 
the Average Opinion is over twice as far from AIA than are the implicit prices. As a 
formal test, one can use an exact sign test to test the hypothesis that the distances are 
equal. At a 5% level, this hypothesis is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that the 
distance from implicit prices to AIA is the smallest. That is, the implicit prices are closer 
to the Aggregate Information Available than are any of the potential baselines. 
In the PIC, the Wilrtz measure of the distance from AIA to implicit prices is generally 
smaller than the distance from AIA to any of the potential baselines ( the DTPI, the CEPI 
Opinion, and the Average Opinion) except the ex-post Best Opinion. In the PI-4 
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condition, these effects are significant for the CEPI and the Average Opinion. The Best 
Opinion is always closer to the truth than the implicit prices. In the PIC-4 this effect is not 
significant, but it is at a 5% level in the PIC-2. It is clear from the tables that information 
aggregation under the PIC is not as good as in the NOT SETS condition. 
The first three results answer the first question. Yes, the parimutuel can successfully 
aggregate information. In the NOT SETS condition, this aggregation process is 
significantly better than one would expect from private information models. Moreover, 
every bettor' s  ex ante opinion, i .e. his opinion before any betting took place, is improved 
by the implicit prices. In the PJC, aggregation occurs, although tl;le market does not do an 
effective job compared to the NOT SETS condition. It usually outperforms the private 
information models, but in most periods one can identify betters who have a 'better' 
opinion before betting than does the market after the period is over. The comparison 
between experimental conditions is formally shown by a Mann-Whitney test. This test 
shows that aggregation in the NOT SETS condition is significantly better than 
aggregation in the PIC at a 5% level. Additionally, information aggregation is only 
slightly better in the PIC-2 than in the PIC-4. Broadly speaking, we do not have evidence 
that the longer that subjects are uncertain about the termination of the market, the more 
information that is aggregated in prices. 
The results also partially answer the second question concerning the principles that best 
describe the aggregation process. Result 4 summarizes model accuracy . As will be 
shown, the CERE model is the best in the NOT SETS condition, whereas private 
information models fit the data best in case of the PIC condition. Such a conclusion 
produces a paradox. How could the information be aggregated while private information 
models fit the data the best? The result is followed by a series of observations and results 
that explore the nature of the evidence. 
RESULT 4. In the NOT SETS condition the Competitive Equilibrium Rational 
Expectations model is the most accurate of the models considered. In the PIC condition 
the most accurate models are the private information models, and the Competitive 
Equilibrium Rational Expectations model is the least accurate. 
SUPPORT. Tables 8 and 9 contain the average distance of the predictions of each of the 
four models from the observed implicit prices. Using the Wurtz measure the predictions 
of the Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations model are on average 0.33 1 away 
from the actual prices in the NOT SETS condition, whereas the private information 
models are further away from the implicit prices. Thus, in this sense, the predictions of 
the Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations model are closer. However, in the 
PIC the private information models are closer. For example, the Decision Theory Private 
Information model has a distance of 0.275 from implicit prices in the PIC-4, whereas the 
Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations model is 0.485 away from implicit 
prices. 
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Results 3 and 4 lead to an interesting question. How can the information be aggregated in 
the PIC, a conclusion that can be supported by Result 3 ,  when the most accurate 
behavioral models such as the Decision Theoretic Private Information Model, is based on 
a principle that assumes that no aggregation at all is taking place? This seeming 
inconsistency of results forces a somewhat deeper look at the data that must be 
accompanied by a realization that no clear explanation why information aggregation 
occurs can be developed from this data set and theory. The section that follows includes 
observations and results that might form the basis for new studies. These observations 
lead to the conjecture that private information models may be the most accurate in the 
sense of averages and in the sense of prices, but cannot explain certain other features of 
the data. These "other features" suggest that individuals are actually behaving 
strategically. 
C. Additional results 
The first question posed is whether or not individuals are investing all of their money. 
The experiments are designed to make sure that participation has a positive expected 
value. Recall that the "house take" was negative. If individuals are risk neutral , and are 
not engaged in strategic or learning behavior, then they should invest up to the limits of 
their capacities to invest. The next result shows that individuals did not fully invest, and, 
more interestingly, invested less in the PIC than in the NOT SETS condition. 
RESULT 5. Individuals invest approximately 75% of their endowments in the NOT SET 
condition and approximately 60% in the PIC. 
SUPPORT. The data are in Table 1 0. The proportions for individual experiments are 
reported in the other rows. They tell us that betters do not fully invest, and more 
interesting, invest less in the PIC than in the NOT SETS condition. An explanation for 
the former might be caused by the risk attitude of the betters, but the failure to fully invest 
is also consistent with strategic behavior where betters wait too long and experience the 
closure of the market before. they can spend their total budget. The difference in 
investment between the NOT SETS and the PIC might be due to the complexity of the 
PIC. Contrary to the NOT SETS condition, knowledge of all information is not sufficient 
to know the winning market in the PIC. Therefore, bets entail more risk in the PIC. This 
might prevent risk-averse betters from investing their complete budgets. However, it 
should be noticed that the experienced betters in the PIC experiment 06 1 996 invest as 
much as in the NOT SETS condition. They invest 72% of their budget in tickets . 
The second question to pose is whether or not there is direct evidence that strategic 
behavior is taking place. The models based on private information require no learning or 
strategic behavior. Result 6 makes clear that strategic behavior exists and is significant. 
As has been noticed in theoretical work (e.g. Palfrey and Srivastava, 1 986), every subject 
has an incentive to disguise his private information . Revealing one 's  private information 
enables other subjects to improve their beliefs about which state will occur. Briefly put, 
individuals have an incentive to bluff or 'lie' about their private information by investing 
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in markets that they think will not win, in hope of attracting investments in those markets. 
They also have an incentive to wait and try to learn from others while revealing nothing 
about their own information. 
RESULT 6 :  Evidence exists for strategic behavior in waiting strategies and in bluffing. 
SUPPORT. The private information models suggest that neither waiting nor bluffing 
should exist in the markets. On the other hand, individuals that are interested in the 
information obtained from the decisions of others have an incentive to wait until the last 
seconds before investing and they should have no interest in investing in "bluffing" in an 
attempt to mislead other individuals. Table 1 1  addresses the issue of the ti'ming of 
spending. It contains data about the proportion of spending that occurred during various 
parts of a period. It is clear that especially in the NOT SETS condition, waiting is 
overwhelming. Most trading occurs in the last seconds before and after the four minute 
time mark. 
The issue of bluffing is addressed by the data in Table 1 2. In the NOT SETS condition, 
bluffing about one's private information can be viewed as purchases of tickets in markets 
that are excluded by one's  private information. Table 1 2  shows that such strategic 
purchases actually occur, although the amount involved with those purchases is 
negligible. The proportions of instances in which strategic behavior can be identified is 
about 1 8% but the percentage of money involved is only 2% of the total spending. 
These strategic purchases directly negatively influence the information aggregation 
properties of the market. Failure to invest until the last second would seem to work 
against information aggregation because it delays the information and gives it less chance 
to become in.tegrated. Indirectly, these actions along with the bluffing and lying can also harm information aggregation as they can have a negative impact on other subjects ' 
beliefs. The next result provid€s a glimP.se of the complexity. 
RESULT 7. Bluffing works against information aggregation. 
SUPPORT. In these experiments, the correlation coefficient between the number of 
strategic purchases as a fraction of the total number of transactions is negatively 
correlated with the Wurtz-measure of information aggregation, in two of the three 
experiments with a NOT SETS condition. Table 1 3  contains the statistics. 
The constellation of results above helps to formulate some conjectures. The first 
conjecture is that convergence is taking place toward the predictions of the Competitive 
Equilibrium Rational Expectations model. 
CONJECTURE 1 .  As periods and experience progress, the implicit prices are moving in 
the direction of the AIA, and the Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations model is 
becoming more accurate relative to other models .  
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SUPPORT. The conjecture has two parts. The first part is addressed by the data in Table 
1 4. The average Wurtz distance from AIA decreases with time under both experimental 
conditions. For example, in the NOT SETS condition the distance is 0.464 on average 
after one-third of all bets are realized, but has decreased to 0.33 1 by the time that the 
experiment ends. In the PIC-2 the distance of .553 after the first 1 /3 of all bets were 
realized becomes reduced to .452 by end. 
The second part of the conjecture is addressed by the data in Table 1 5 . The table shows 
the average Wurtz distance of the predictions of the various models from the implicit 
prices. Again, these measurements are made for times when one-third of all bets are 
realized, two-thirds of all bets are realized, and at the end of the market period. As can be 
seen, under all experimental conditions the predictions of the Competitive Equilibrium 
Rational Expectations Model get consistently closer to the actual implicit prices as time 
increases. This convergence is significantly stable in the direction of the AIA, except for 
the second phase in the PIC-2 but even there it is in the AIA direction. Under none of the 
conditions do any of the other models move closer to the AIA. Other models demonstrate 
either no consistent convergence pattern or actually converge away from the implicit 
prices. 
While the conjecture may be true on average, it would be a mistake to claim that the 
convergence process is uniform or always present. The next observation demonstrates 
that the rational expectations story is not in any sense complete or reliable in every 
instant. 
OBSERVATION 2. Herding can occur. 
SUPPORT. Herding occurs when a clearly wrong market attracts most of the investment. 
Period 1 1  of experiment 1 1 3095 is an example. The implicit prices are shown in Figure 
3-A,B . In this period of the experiment several agents developed opinions that the state 
was SX, but it was not. The dynamic is also suggested when the market with the highest 
price continues to experience price increases and the market with the lowest price 
experiences decreases. Table 1 6  and Table 1 7  demonstrate the existence of the dynamic. 
Under both the NOT SETS condition and PIC the maximum implicit price is, on 
average, increasing and the minimum implicit price is, on average, decreasing. However, 
even though the existence of the phenomena can be demonstrated, its pervasiveness can 
be solidly rejected. In the NOT SETS condition, the maximum implicit price is generally 
close to one, but the market with the maximum price is not arbitrary. In 29 of 38 market 
periods the market with the highest price is also the true state. Even though the learning 
can be wrong, for the most part it is right. 
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8 .  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study inquires about the possibility of designing parimutuel type betting systems to 
aggregate information held by decentrally located agents . The first question posed was 
whether or not it could be done. The second question was whether or not standard 
models could be used to understand what is observed. The hope is that information 
aggregation success, accompanied by a deeper understanding of the reasons for success, 
will lead to improved designs. 
The study began by looking at parimutuel systems found occurring naturally in the field 
and at aspects of theory for suggestions about what might be expected. From the field 
one can get, at best, hints about the general properties of information aggregation. 
Existing parimutuel systems were designed for entertainment purposes and whether or not 
they successfully aggregate information cannot be known because the critical parameters 
are unknown for purposes of analysis. Nevertheless what is known about the behavior of 
parimutuel systems found in the field and the methods of observation, was very helpful in 
this study. Theory was helpful but we cannot really claim that the mechanism that we 
developed was designed from first principles since we do not know what those are. 
Indeed, there is no clear theoretical reason why parimutuel systems should aggregate 
information at all .  Thus, the mechanism design reflected observations that came from 
naturally occurring events, theory and a long history of laboratory work. 
S ince very little is known, a sequential approach was adopted. After the major features of 
the parimutuel process were determined, the experiments began with environments that 
were on the "boundary" of experiments in which information aggregation had been 
observed in asset market experiments . Initial successes then encouraged the study of 
environments that are much more complex, from an information aggregation point of 
view, than anything that has been studied to date. 
The first conclusions reached by this exploratory analysis are promising. Information 
aggregation over several chosen "baselines" can clearly be observed (Result 3) .  
However, in the more complex environments, the results contain ambiguities. The 
support for any claim that information aggregation has taken place depends upon the 
baselines chosen for "no aggregation". 
Analysis of behavior (Result 4) demonstrates that the "simplest" environment resulted in 
strong support for the Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations model . This model 
was most accurate relative to models in which individuals myopically base decisions on 
private information alone. The implicit prices were very close to the prices that would 
exist if all agents pooled their information and made decisions on the basis of the pooled 
data. However, in the more complex environments the most accurate model , based on 
average predictions, is a decision theoretic model based on myopic individual decision 
behavior in which the individual simply spends all of the money on the option that is 
most l ikely according to the individual ' s  private information . 
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The paradox created by the contradictory results stimulated deeper studies of the data to 
determine if individuals were indeed behaving myopically or whether the averages were 
masking events. On the one hand there is evidence that people do not act myopically and 
in isolation. They do not necessarily spend all of their money as would a risk neutral 
decision maker (Result 5). They engage in waiting behavior, suggesting an interest in 
learning form others and they also engage in bluffing behavior (Result 6). Thus, they 
demonstrate a sensitivity to the existence of others and the possibility that the actions of 
others may contain useful information and that others are looking to them for the same 
purposes. 
On the other hand, bluffing works against information aggregation (Result 7). 
Nevertheless, a conjecture is developed that, with experience, implicit prices are moving 
toward full  revelation and behavior is moving toward that predicted by the Competitive 
Equilibrium Rational Expectations Model (Conjecture 1 ) . 
The general pattern seems to be for individuals to "jump on" the favorite with the crowd 
and "jump off' of the least active markets in a manner typical of herding. In fact, bubbles 
can occur (Observation 2) but they are by no means a pervasive part of the data. 
Although phenomena (the occurrence of bubbles and "disaggregation" of information) 
characteristic of herding behavior are observed, the overall picture drawn by these 
experiments is that parimutuel markets do have the capacity to aggregate the widely 
dispersed information held by the subjects. 
Interestingly enough, the data in the laboratory has some of the major features of the field 
data (Result 1 )  including some well known biases such as the favorite/longshot bias 
(Observation I) .  Evidently, looking to field data for hints was not a bad idea. 
Parenthetically, these results suggest that the biases found in field data may result for 
entirely different reasons from biases in individual decision making. Since the subjects 
were given the computations from Bayes' Law, the role of individual decision biases in 
the experiment was substantially reduced. 
One must be concerned with the question, "can improved mechanisms can be designed?" 
One possible improvement is a mechanism to allow subjects to sell back their tickets in 
some sort of open market. Such a mechanism may increase the informational efficiency. 
This suggestion is based on the belief that information aggregation in ordinary securities 
markets also relies on the information revealed by bids and asks (limit orders) that are 
observed by all agents but might not be successful . In parimutuel markets such 
information is not available. Every action directly influences one's budget. In order to 
explore the implications of this intuition, two periods (period 1 7  and 1 8  in experiment 
06 1 996) were designed to allow subjects to sell back their tickets at any moment they 
wanted. In the first of the two periods, subjects did not use the sell-back provision. The 
gross tickets sales (3890 tickets) was not much higher than the net tickets sales (32 19  
tickets) .  In the second period of the two, the sell-back provision was used actively. The 
gross tickets sales (6423 tickets) was considerably higher than the net tickets sales (4047 
tickets) .  Is information aggregation taking place? Table 1 8  shows the Wurtz measure of 
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distance from implicit prices to AIA at various times in both periods. If we attribute the 
results of period 1 7  to lack of experience, the results in period 1 8  are simultaneously 
disappointing and promising. The bad news is that, overall, market prices are not closer 
to the AIA as in similar conditions where the sell-back option was not available. The 
good news from period 1 8  is that the convergence process is much faster. Even at the 
end, considerable improvement in aggregation is observed. Of course, the limitations of 
these data are considerable and are presented here only to stimulate further research and 
thought about the problem. 
The parimutuel institution is a powerful device for aggregating i11formation. Whether or 
not versions can be invented that improve upon the version we designed and tested 
remains to be seen. Many aspects of the mechanism are not understood. In particular the 
role of risk-aversion may be to bias prices and the possible information contained in the 
fact that not all budgets were invested has not been studied. Clearly the models of the 
process are simple compared to the complexity of the process. How experience or special 
talents for operating within the process might influence the capacity of the mechanism to 
perform is an open question. Nevertheless, even though many questions exist, the power 




This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions carefully 
and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be 
paid to you in cash. The currency in these markets is francs. All francs will be converted 
to dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of __ francs = 1 US dollar. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct several markets in which you will participate 
for a number of periods. Each period, there are __ markets open for trading; this 
number will be announced at the beginning of each period. In the markets you will be 
able to purchase tickets to a lottery that pays according to the event that occurs at the end 
of the period. Each market is associated with a particular event. The lottery payoff will be 
shared by those that hold winning tickets in proportion to the number of tickets 
purchased. In addition, there will be a 'bonus prize' that is shared the same way. In the 
experiment, the bonus prize is francs. 
Consider an example with three markets labeled A, B ,  and C and a "bonus prize" of 27 
francs. Market A is associated with 'event A' ,  market B is associated with 'event B '  and 
market C is associated with 'event C' . Suppose that the tickets in each market are sold at 
1 franc each. Suppose further that you purchase 3 tickets in market B and 0 tickets in each 
of the other two markets. Suppose that a total of 9 tickets are sold in market B (three are 
sold to you and six are sold to other people) ;  a total of 3 tickets are sold in market A (all 3 
are sold to other people) ; a total of 6 tickets are sold in market C (all 6 are sold to other 
people) . Thus a total of 1 8  tickets are sold in all markets together. These purchases are 
shown in the table below in columns 1 and 2. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
tickets you all tickets lottery payoff bonus payoff total of payoff total payoff 
purchased in purchased in multiple multiple multiples 
market market 
A 0 3 
B 3 9 
c 0 6 
total tickets 
sales = 18 
The pattern of ticket sales determines two different types of payoff multiples, a lottery 
payoff multiple and a bonus payoff multiple. Your payoff for each winning ticket you 
hold is the sum of these two multiples. That is, your payoff for each winning ticket you 
hold is the lottery payoff multiple plus the bonus payoff multiple. Thus 
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your total payoff = (lottery payoff multiple + bonus payoff multiple) times 
the number of winning tickets you hold. 
The lottery payoff multiple, the lottery payoff per winning ticket, is the total of all tickets 
sold in all markets, divided by the number of tickets sold in the winning market. In the 
example the total number of tickets sold is 1 8 . 
Suppose that event B occurs. Then the tickets in market B are the winning tickets. The 
number of winning tickets is 9. Thus, as shown in column 3, the lottery payoff multiple 
is 1 8/9 = 2. 
The bonus in the example is 27 francs. The bonus payoff multiple .is the amount of the 
bonus per winning ticket. That is, the bonus payoff multiple is the bonus divided by the 
number of tickets sold in the winning market as shown in column 4, 27/9 = 3 .  
Thus the total of payoff multiples, shown in  column 5 ,  is the lottery payoff multiple of  2 
plus the bonus payoff multiple of 3 .  That is, the total of payoff multiples is 2 + 3 = 5.  
Your payoff from the winning tickets that you hold is the total of payoff multiples times 
the number of winning tickets that you hold. In the example this is 5 times 3 winning 
tickets = 1 5 . Those that hold tickets in market A and C, which are not winning markets, 
would receive nothing for these tickets . 
bonus=27 
1 . 2 3 4 5 6 
t ickets you all tickets lottery payoff bonus payoff total of payoff total payoff 
purchased in purchased in multiple multiple multiples 
market market 
A 0 3 
B 3 9 18/9=2 27/9=3 2+3=5 5x3=15 
c 0 6 
total tickets 
sales = 18 
Record Sheet 
Attached you will find a record sheet. This will help you with the decisions you make. At 
the beginning of a period you will be given __ francs. You will find this in the upper 
right of your computer screen as cash on hand. You can use these francs to purchase 
tickets in markets of your choice or you can simply hold the cash as you wish. At the end 
of the period you will be required to return __ francs to the experimenter. This 
amount will be found at the bottom of the record sheet in the row labeled payment to the 
experimenter. At the end of each period, record your purchases in each market. You 
should also write the payoff multiples for each market, which are recorded by the 
experimenters . After the winning market is announced, calculate your total payoff 
(winning tickets times total of payoff multiples). Add your francs on hand to the total 
payoff, and then subtract the payment to the experimenter of __ . The difference is 
your earnings for the period. Write these earnings also in the payout sheet. 
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Suppose you had been given 50 francs at the beginning of the period and that you are 
required to return 30 at the end of the period. Suppose further that your purchases are as 
described in the example above. The appropriate entries you should make are in the table 
below. In the first column, you record your purchases. Then, you have to record the 
payoff multiples, which will be announced by the experimenter. 
tickets you lottery bonus total of wmmng total payoff 
purchased payoff payoff payoff market 
in market multiple multiple multiples 
A 0 6 9 1 5  
B 3 2 3 5 x 1 5  
c 0 3 4.5 7 .5 
. .  
. .  
. .  
+ total cash on hand 47 
total cash on hand plus total payoff 62 
- payment to the experimenter 30 
total earnings 32 
Suppose that event B occurs. Then market B is the winning market, which is indicated by 
an 'X' . You can calculate now your total payoff, winning tickets times the total of payoff 
multiples. You purchased 3 tickets, so you spent 3 francs. Thus, your cash on hand will 
be the amount given to you at the beginning of the period, minus 3 francs = 50 - 3 = 47 
francs. Thus, your total cash on hand plus total payoff is 47+ 1 5  = 62. The payment to the 
experimenter is equal to 30 francs. Thus your total earnings in this period is 62 - 30 =32 . 
Events 
The event associated with a period, will be announced at the end of the period. The event 
has been pre-chosen using a random number table, which you may inspect after the 
experiment. Every possible event is equally likely to occur (i.e. if you repeat this 




At the beginning of each period one of the experimenters will offer a total of __ 
tickets for sale at each market for 1 franc for each ticket. The number of tickets and the 
price can be read in the 'Ask' window of your screen. At any time, as someone purchases 
a certain number of tickets at a market, the total amount of tickets for sale at that market 
drops by this number. These numbers enable you to calculate the payoff multiples as they 
change. The number of tickets sold at each market and the total of payoff multiples will 
also be repeated on the whiteboard. 
Purchases can be made using the <Ctrl> <Fl >  keys. Do not use the <F3> key. 
Period timing 
Each period will last a minimum of __ minutes and a maximum of __ minutes ; 
the exact time is randomly chosen by using a random number table; every time within the 
minimum and maximum time is equally likely to occur. 
Information about events 
There will be six markets, labeled SX, SY, SZ, TX, TY, and TZ. Each market is 
represented by two names, a first name and a second name. The first name is either S or 
T. The second name is either X, Y, or Z. Events are associated with markets; market SX 
is associated with 'event SX', market SY is associated with 'event SY', and so on. 
Before the period begins, information about the event that occurs will be distributed. 
Some people will be given the first name of the event that occurs. Other people will be 
given information that eliminates for possibility of one of the three second names. All 
information combined, completely determines the name of the event that occurs. 
Suppose that the event, which has been randomly drawn, is 'event SY' . Then the 
following types of information cards will be in the box: 
Information 
first name is S 
Information: 
second name is 
not X 
Information: 
second name is 
not Z 
There will be an equal number of each card in the box. The number of people who draw 
each card will be the same. 
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APPENDIX B :  
Private Information 
In the NOT SETS condition, the following slips were distributed. 
Information: Information: 
first name is S first name is T 
Information: Information: Information : 
second name is not X second name is not Y second name is not Z 
In the PIC, information slips had the following particular form: 
INFORMATION 
Machine I D : Period : 0 
The number o f  s l ip s  we have drawn f or you for each market ,  are 
sx SY s z  TX TY 
1 0 1 0 1 
TZ 
0 
W i t h  t h i s  private informat i on ,  you can form a gue s s  about which event wi l l  
occur . T o  he lp you wi t h  these c a l cu l a t i ons , we show you the cond i t i onal 
probab i l i t i es that each event wi l l  occur , given this i n forma t i on 
sx SY s z  TX TY TZ 
0 . 2 3 8  0 . 0 9 5  0 . 2 3 8  0 . 0 9 5  0 . 2 3 8  0 . 0 9 5  
Note that the sum o f  the c ondi t i onal probabi l i t i es i s  ( about ) 1 .  
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APPENDIX C: Record Sheet 
RECORD SHEET 
Name 
Machine ID # 
Period 
Information 
tickets you lottery bonus total of winning total payoff 
purchased payoff payoff payoff market 







+ total cash on hand 
total cash on hand plus total payoff 




An Example of the Concepts 
To illustrate the different concepts used in this paper, consider the following example. 
Three individuals denoted by A, B and C, are given the following information slips in the 
probabilistic information condition (PIC). In the table below, each cell (i,j) denotes the 
number of times state j occurs in i ' s  sample. For example, individual A receives the 
sample { SX,SZ,TX } .  
sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
A 1 0 1 1 0 0 
B 0 2 1 0 0 0 
c 0 0 1 0 1 1 
The prior probability of each state is known to be 1/6 and the conditional probabilities of 
a sample given the state are known and are given in the text. Thus, by an application of 
Bayes Law, given these information slips, each individual is able to update his/her beliefs 
about the state that occurs . These beliefs, captured by the concept private information, 
are described in the following table. Each cell (i ,j) gives i ' s  conditional probability that 
state j is the state that occurs, given i ' s  information slip. 
sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
A 0.238 0.095 0.238 0.238 0.095 0.095 
B 0.078 0.490 0. 196 0.078 0.078 0.078 
c 0.095 0.095 0.238 0.095 0.238 0.238 
All information in the system is contained in the information slips held by individuals. If 
this information is collected and pooled, Bayes Law can be applied to the pooled data to 
get the best possible estimate of the state given the information that exists. This pooled 
and processed information is called the Aggregate Information Available (AIA). This 
distribution is described below. Each entry describes the conditional probability that the 
state occurs, given the information on all information slips. 
I sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
AIA I 0.018 0. 196 0.490 0.078 0.078 0.078 
Of course AIA is  unknown to the individuals who hold their information slips privately 
and must make decisions on the information on their own slip together with anything that 
is signaled from the economic activity that takes place in the parimutuel betting process. 
Several different models predict the individual behavior that will be observed. Given the 
distribution of private information among individuals, the models give unique predictions 
about the implicit prices that will prevail at the end of the parimutuel betting period. 
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First, the Decision Theory Private lnfonnation Model (DTPI) assumes that each 
individual invests his/her total budget on the state that is most likely to occur according to 
the private information. In case of ties between states, it is assumed that the individual 
equally divides his/her budget between these most likely states. The following table 
shows individual investments in each market as a fraction of total individual investment. 
The implicit prices automatically follow from these individual decisions . 
sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
A 0.333 0 0.333 0.333 0 0 
B 0 1 0 0 0 0 
c 0 0 0.333 0 0 .333 0 .333 
Implicit 
Price 0. 1 1 1  0.333 0.222 0. 1 1 1  0. 1 1 1  0. 1 1 1  
Next, the Competitive Equilibrium Private Information Model (CEPI) predicts a price 
pattern that is rationalized by individuals maximizing their expected profits, given the 
implicit prices and their private information. They are assumed to not condition their 
beliefs about states on the prices that they observe. In the table below the unique price 
prediction is given. Individual investment in a market as a fraction of total individual 
investment follows from these prices, and also generates these prices . 
sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
A 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0 0 
B 0 1 0 0 0 0 
c 0 0 0.2 0 0.4 0.4 
Implicit 
Price 0. 1 33 0.333 0. 1 33 0. 1 33 0. 1 33 0. 1 33 
Third the Proportional Allocafion assumes that each individual invests in proportion to 
his/her private information. In the example, this model generates the following 
prediction. Notice that the implicit prices are the averages of the beliefs of the 
individuals. Later this will be termed the Average Opinion. 
sx SY sz TX TY TZ 
A 0.238 0.095 0.238 0.238 0.095 0.095 
B 0.078 0.490 0. 1 96 0.078 0.078 0.078 
c 0.095 0.095 0.238 0.095 0.238 0.238 
Implicit 
Prices 0. 1 37 0.227 0.224 0. 1 37 0. 1 37 0. 1 37 
Finally, the Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations Model predicts that 
individuals will invest such that implicit prices coincide with the AIA. Individual 
investments should satisfy this price condition, but any individual investment generating 
these prices serves as a model prediction. 
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The models can be used to understand the nature of behavior but a notion of information 
aggregation and revelation is also needed. For this purpose the behavioral models also 
produce baseline standards for a concept of "no information aggregation". The implicit 
prices deduced from the applications of the various behavioral model can be viewed as 
"opinions" as expressed by the markets. The DTPI Opinion, the CEPI Opinion, and the 
Average Opinion are described by the implicit prices from the DTPI model, the CEPI 
model, and the Proportional Allocation Model respectively. The Best Opinion coincides 
with the private information closest to the AIA. In a sense, if these prices prevail , one 
might conclude that the behavior exhibited in the markets reflected no aggregation of 
information at all beyond that privately held. 
The information content of these opinions can be measured in terms of their "distance" 
from AIA. Below, one can read the individual distances from private information to AIA 
for both the Wurtz measure as the Kullback-Leibler measure. Under both measures, B ' s  
private information i s  closest to the AIA, and accordingly, B ' s  private information 
describes the Best Opinion. As can be determined from the table the 
Wurtz-measure Kullback-Leibler measure 
A 0.353 0.325 
B (Best Opinion) 0.294 0.269 
c 0.353 0.325 
DTPI Opinion 0.269 0. 1 76 
CEPI Opinion 0.357 0.369 
Average Opinion 0.267 0. 1 79 
DTPI Opinion and the Average Opinion are both closer to AIA than is the Best Opinion. 
The CEPI Opinion is the furthest from AIA. The intuition that one can draw from these 
examples is that models that involve to optimization ( Proportional Allocation), 
adjustment to the environment or prices (DTPI), or learning from the market activity 
(CEPI) can nevertheless produce prices that are "close" to the aggregated information that 
exists in the system (AIA). Thus, these baselines are difficult standards against which 
aggregation can be measured and assessed. 
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Table 1 :  P ters in All E t 
Parameters 1 1 1995 1 12995 1 12995 1 2 1 595 06 1 896A 06 1 896B 061 996 
Number of 3 (period 0-2) 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Markets K 6 (period 3-8) 
Information NOT SETS NOT SETS NOT SETS PIC PIC PIC PIC 
Structure (period 0- 1 6) (period 0- 1 6) (period 0- 1 6) (period 0- 1 6) (period 0- 1 6) (period 0- 1 6) 
PIC PIC 
period 1 7- 1 8) (period 1 7- 1 8) 
Endowment E 100 francs 100 francs 100 francs 100 francs 100 francs 100 francs 100 francs · 
Loan L 300 francs 300 francs 300 francs 300 francs 300 francs 300 francs 300 francs 
House Charge - 1 200 francs - 1 200 francs - 1 500 francs - 1 000 francs - 1 200 francs - 1 200 francs - 1 200 francs 
H 
Number of 12  12  1 5  1 0  1 2  1 2  1 2  
Subjects 
Period Length (4,5) (4,5) (4,5) (4,5) (2,5) (2,5) (2,5) 
(T min, T max) 
Price per ticket lfranc I franc lfranc lfranc 1 franc 1 franc 1 franc 
Initial Number 5,000 5 ,000 6,000 5,000 5 ,000 5,000 5 ,000 
of Tickets for 
Sale 
Conversion 100 francs = 100 francs = 100 francs = 100 francs = 100 francs = 100 francs = 100 francs = 
Rate 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 1 US dollar 
Experience no no no no no no yes 
Table 2 .A :  Predictions of Implicit Prices : NOT SETS Information 
Condition, K=3 ,  and (sx) is the State. 
Proportional 















Table 2.B :  Predictions of Implicit Prices : NOT SETS Conditions, K=6, and 
(sx) is the State. 
Psx Ps Psz Pix p ,  Ptz 
Proportional 




Equilibrium Private 0. 167 0. 1 67 0. 1 67 0. 1 67 0. 1 67 0. 1 67 
Information 
Competitive 
Equilibrium Rational 0 0 0 0 0 
Ex12ectations (AIA) 
Table 2 .C:  Predictions of Competitive Equilibrium Private Information 
model. :  Implicit Prices under Probabilistic Information Conditions 
Psx Psy Psz PTX PTY PTZ 
Period 17 , 1 1 2995 0. 167 0.250 0. 1 39 0. 1 39 0. 167 0. 1 39 
Period 1 8, 1 12995 0. 142 0 . 142 0. 14 1 0.350 0.083 0. 142 
Period 17 , 1 13095 0. 146 0.267 0. 147 0. 146 0 . 147 0. 1 47 
Period 1 8, 1 13095 0. 150 0. 150 0.250 0. 150 0. 150 0. 150 
Period 1 , 1 2 1595 0. 150 0.286 0. 1 15 0 . 100 0.200 0. 150 
Period 2, 1 21595 0. 195 0. 195 0 . 100 0. 194 0. 122 0. 195 
Period 3, 1 21595 0.286 0. 1 14 0. 150 0. 150 0. 150 0. 150 
Period 4, 1 21595 0. 150 0. 150 0.200 0. 167 0. 167 0. 167 
Period 5 , 1 21595 0. 167 0. 100 0.300 0.200 0.067 0. 166 
Period 6, 1 21595 0. 167 0. 167 0. 167 0. 167 0. 167 0. 167 
Period 7, 1 2 1595 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0.200 
Period 8, 1 21595 0. 1 00 . 0. 150 0. 1 00 0. 143 0.357 0. 150 
Period 9, 1 2 1595 0.095 0.238 0.238 0.095 0.238 0.095 
Period 1 0, 1 21595 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0. 160 0.200 
Period 1 1 , 1 21595 0. 1 00 0. 1 33 0.333 0. 150 0. 133 0. 150 
Period 1 2, 1 2 1595 0. 154 0 . 167 0. 167 0. 166 0. 1 00 0.246 
Period 1 3 ,  1 2 1595 0. 190 0. 150 0.200 0. 150 0. 1 19 0. 190 
Period 1 4, 1 2 1595 0.200 0.200 0. 150 0. 150 0. 1 00 0.200 
Period 15 , 12 1595 0. 140 0.300 0 . 140 0. 140 0. 140 0. 1 40 
Period 16, 1 21595 0.286 0. 150 0. 150 0. 150 0. 150 0. 1 14 
Table 2.D :  Predictions of the Competitive Equilibrium Rational 
Expectations Model: Implicit Prices under Probabilistic Information 
Conditions 
Psx Psy Psz PTX PTY PTZ 
Period 17 , 1 12995 0.002 0.989 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004 
Period 1 8, 1 12995 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Period 17, 1 13095 0.01 0  0.961 0.025 0.00 1 0.000 0.004 
Period 1 8, 1 1 3095 0.000 0.001 0.998 0.000 0.00 1 0.000 
Period l ,  1 21595 0.001 0.926 0.004 0.001 0.059 0.009 
Period 2, 1 21595 0. 1 13 0. 1 13 0.00 1 0.045 0.0 1 8 0.709 
Period 3 , 1 2 1595 0.999 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Period 4, 1 2 1595 0.004 0.027 0.4 1 8  0.4 1 8  0.067 0.067 
Period 5 , 1 21595 0. 156 0.001 0.390 0.390 0.000 0.062 
Period 6, 1 21595 0.030 0.475 0.0 1 2 0.005 0.002 0.475 
Period 7, 1 21595 0.01 0 0.004 0.004 0.0 10 0.001 0.972 
Period 8, 1 21595 0.000 0.01 0 0.000 0.000 0.990 0.000 
Period 9, 121595 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.998 0.000 
Period 1 0, 12 1595 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.060 0.004 0.932 
Period 1 1 , 1 2 1595 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Period 1 2, 1 2 1595 0.002 0.004 0.0 1 0 0.01 0 0.002 0.973 
Period 1 3 ,  1 2 1595 0.0 1 8  0.003 0.279 0.001 0.003 0.697 
Period 1 4, 1 2 1595 0.002 0.994 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Period 15, 121595 0.004 0.903 0.058 0.023 0.004 0.009 
Period 16, 12 1595 0.99 1 0.002 0.00 1 0.004 0.002 0.001 
Table 2.E: Predictions of the Proportional Allocation Model: Implicit Prices 
under Probabilistic Information Conditions 
Psx Psy Psz PTx PTY PTZ 
Period 1 7 , 1 12995 0. 160 0.262 0. 137 0. 125 0. 159 0. 157 
Period 1 8 , 1 1 2995 0. 1 7 1  0 . 16 1 0. 1 05 0.358 0.09 1 0. 1 13 
Period 17, 1 1 3095 0. 157 0.244 0. 177 0. 15 1 0. 1 15 0. 156 
Period 1 8, 1 1 3095 0. 1 39 0. 168 0.268 0. 140 0. 148 0. 1 38 
Period 1 ,  1 21595 0. 1 14 0.263 0. 1 37 0. 1 1 1  0.205 0. 169 
Period 2, 121595 0. 185 0. 183 0. 1 0 1  0. 168 0. 139 0.224 
Period 3, 1 21595 0.3 14 0. 1 16 0. 162 0. 1 19 0. 142 0. 147 
Period 4, 121595 0. 1 17 0. 141 0.2 14 0.20 1 0. 157 0. 170 
Period 5, 1 2 1595 0. 193 0.099 0.237 0.220 0.085 0. 166 
Period 6, 121595 0. 170 0.2 13 0. 146 0. 144 0. 1 17 0.2 10 
Period 7 , 1 21595 0. 162 0. 145 0. 145 0. 172 0. 1 19 0.258 
Period 8 , 1 2 1595 0. 126 0.207 0.099 0. 1 1 1  0.3 19 0. 137 
Period 9, 1 2 1595 0. 104 0. 159 0. 188 0. 104 0.342 0. 104 
Period 10, 121595 0. 130 0. 130 0. 130 0. 185 0. 157 0.268 
Period 1 1 ,  1 2 1595 0. 1 1 1  0. 123 0.3 19 0. 167 0. 1 1 1  0. 169 
Period 1 2, 12 1595 0. 125 0. 157 0. 158 0. 153 0. 140 0.268 
Period 1 3 , 1 21595 0. 169 0. 125 0.220 0. 1 14 0. 138 0.234 
Period 14, 12 1595 0. 174 0.284 0. 1 3 1  0. 13 1 0. 104 0. 176 
Period 15, 12 1595 0. 1 26 0.267 . 0. 169 0. 170 0. 128 0. 140 
Period 16, 121595 0.285 0. 147 0. 133 0. 159 0. 147 0. 128 
Table 3 :  Average Implicit Price and Relative Frequency of Winning Given 
Rank in the NOT SETS Information Condition: Rank Determined by 
I I' . P . mp IClt nee. 
Market Average Implicit Relative Frequency of Standard error t-statistic 
Rank Price given Rank Winning given Rank of Relative 
by (Objective winning Frequency of 
Implicit probability) Winning 
Price (2) (3) (4) [(2)-(3)]/(4) 
1 st 0.744 0.763 0.069 -0.280 
2nd 0. 1 6 1  0. 1 32 0.055 0.542 
3rd 0.055 0.053 0.036 0.064 
4th 0.023 0.026 0.026 -0. 1 28 
5th 0.0 1 2  0.026 0.026 -0.563 
6th 0.005 0.000 0.000 -
Number of periods included is 38. 
Table 4 :  Average Implicit Price and Relative Frequency of Winning Given 
Rank in Probabilistic Information Conditions :  Rank Determined by Implicit 
Price. 
Market Average Implicit Relative Frequency of Standard error t-statistic 
Rank Price given Rank Winning given Rank of Relative 
by (Objective winning Frequency of 
Implicit probability) Winning 
Price (2) (3) (4) [(2)-(3)]/( 4) 
1 st 0.536 0.588 0.060 -0.87 1 
2nd 0.2 1 7  0.235 0.05 1 -0.356 
3rd 0. 1 09 0.074 0.032 1 . 1 25 
4th 0.063 0.059 0.029 0. 1 38 
5th 0.043 0.029 0.020 0.658 
6th 0.032 0.0 1 5  0.0 1 5  1 . 1 8 1  
Number of periods included is 68. 
Table 5 :  Estimated Coefficient of � in the Model wi = ai + � P(s I Xj) + tj 
(t-values): Relation Between Profits and Inside Information. 
Information Structure Estimated coefficient � 
NOT SETS 344.34 (0.86) 
PIC-4 1 250.95 (8.87) 
PIC-2 1 078 .07 ( 1 0.89) 
Table 6: Average Wurtz Distance of Distribution from the AIA Distribution 
( 1 t d d d  . f ) samp e s an ar evia 10n . 
Dec.Th. CEPI Average Best Implicit 
P.I. Opinion Opinion Opinion Prices 
Opinion 
NOT SETS 0.722 0.833 0.722 0.667 0.33 1 
(-) (-) (-) (-) (0.276) 
PIC-4 0.485 0.654 0.629 0.403 0.485 
(0. 1 1 8) (0. 1 2 1) (0. 1 1 3) (0. 1 49) (0. 1 92) 
PIC-2 0.5 1 6  0.663 0.634 0.320 0.452 
(0. 1 1 5) (0. 1 30) (0. 1 25) (0. 129) (0. 1 72) 
Table 7 :  Average Kullback-Leibler Distance of Distribution from the AIA 
D ' t ' b  f ( 1 t d d d . f ) lS fl u 10n samp e s an ar evia 10n . Dec. Th. CEPI Average 
P.I. Opinion Opinion 
Opinion1 
PIC-2 1 .745 2.883 2.694 
(0.833) ( 1 .428) ( 1 .380) 
PIC-4 2. 1 1 7 3 .227 2.973 
( 1 .084) ( 1 .562) ( 1 .530) 
Best Implicit 
Opinion Prices 
1 .660 1 .722 
( l .594) (0.8 1 5) 
l .2 1 0  1 .861  
(0.659) ( 1 . 224) 
1 Results of two (four) periods are deleted in the PIC-2 (PIC-4), as the myopic opinion contained 
probability mass of zero for some market. 
Table 8:  Average Wurtz Measure of Distance of Model Predictions from 
I l' ' t  P . ( 1 t d d d . f ) mp lCl nces samp e s an ar evia ion . 
Decision Proportional Competitive 
Theory Allocation Equilibrium 
Private Private 
Information Information 
NOT SETS 0.523 0.523 0.620 
(0. 1 03) (0. 1 03) (0. 1 2 1 )  
PIC-4 0.275 0.332 0.342 
(0. 1 02) (0. 1 0 1 )  (0.098) 
PIC-2 0.301 0.366 0.392 





0.3 3 1  
(0.276) 
0.485 
(0. 1 92) 
0.452 
(0. 1 72) 
Table 9: Average Kullback-Leibler Measure of Distance of Model 
P d' f f I l' ' t  P . ( 1 t d d d ) re 1c ions rom mp 1c1 nces samp e s an ar eviation . Decision Proportional Competitive Competitive 
Theory Allocation Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Private Private Rational 
Information 1 Information Expectations 
(AIA) 
PIC-4 0.246 0.3 1 3  0.336 1 .722 
(0. 1 99) (0. 1 8 1 )  (0. 1 77) (0.8 1 5) 
PIC-2 0.277 0.347 0.399 1 .861 
(0. 1 79) (0. 1 46) (0. 1 65) ( 1 .224) 
1 Results of two (four) periods are deleted in PIC-4 (PIC-2) as the myopic opinion contained probability 
mass of zero for some market. 
Table 1 0 :  Average Investment in Tickets Per Period as a Percentage of the 
Maximum Possible. 
1 1 1 995 1 12995 1 1 3095 1 2 1 595 06 1 896A 061 896B 06 1 996 
NOT SETS 0.7 14  0.773 0.720 
PIC-4 0.753 0.6 1 8  0.6 1 7  
PIC-2 0.501 0.542 0.720 
Table 1 1 :  Average Percentage of Total Volume of Spending that Occurred 
' th'  D . t d T '  P . d Wl m es1gna e 1me eno s. 
-
� 230 seconds from 230-240 seconds 240 seconds from 
period open from period open period open - end 
1 1 1 995 0.238 0.366 0..397 
1 1 2995 0. 1 14  0. 1 1 7 0.769 
1 1 3095 0. 1 86 0.327 0.487 
1 2 1 595 0.670 0.203 0. 1 27 
NOT SETS 0. 1 54 0.226 0.620 
PIC-4 0.585 0.242 0. 1 73 
� 1 00 seconds from 1 00- 1 40 seconds 140 seconds from 
period open from period open period open - end 
06 1 896A 0.245 0.420 0.335 
06 1 896B 0. 1 64 0.422 0.4 1 4  
06 1 996 0.288 0.493 0.2 1 9  
PIC-2 0.232 0.445 0.323 
Table 1 2: Strategic Purchases Expressed as a Fraction of the Number of 
T t' d F t '  f th A t f M I 1 d ransac 10ns an as a rac 10n o e moun o oney nvo ve . 
Strategic Purchases as a Strategic Purchases as a 
Fraction of Total Purchases Fraction of Total Purchases 
(in number of transactions) (in number of francs) 
1 1 1 995 0.203 0.009 
1 12995 0. 1 63 0.0 1 6  
1 1 3095 0. 1 9 1  0.028 
NOT SETS 0. 1 8 1  0.020 
Table 1 3 :  Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the Number of Strategic 
Purchases (as a Fraction of the Total Number of Purchases) and the Wurtz 
M f n· t f I l' ' t  f AIA easure o 1s ance o mp 1c1 pnces rom 
Experiment 1 1 1 995 1 1 2995 1 1 3095 
Average Pearson -0.704 -0.596 0.049 
Correlation Coefficient 
Table 14: Average Wurtz Measure of Distance of Implicit Prices from AIA 
a t V  
. T D . P . d ( 1 t d d d  . f ) anous 1mes unng eno s. samp e s an ar evia 10n 
1 /3 of total bets 2/3 of total bets 
realized realized 
overall 
�--- ... -- -- -·-�· ··---�-�----�-----····--· .. ·-···-··�-·---�·--· -·-· ........... .... -� 
NOT SETS 0.464 0.367 0.33 1 
(0.29 1 )  (0.284) (0.276) 
PIC-4 0.6 1 9  0.506 0.485 
••·�-�•-·•-• .. ••m�•·•·��-••-�m--.-.-m-•••••••• -·····--_ _JQ:2Q_?.2. ....... _ ..........
.
...... ··-·······-----·-·(Q.2_9-?..L .... --· ···-- ·-···--·····---C9:l 92_L. ___ ____ 
PIC-2 0.553 0.473 0.452 
(0. 1 75) (0. 1 72) (0. 1 72) 
Table 1 5 :  Average Wurtz Distance of Model Predictions from Implicit 
P . f S 1 d T'  P . d ( 1 t d d d . t '  ) nces or e ecte 1me eno s.  samp e s an ar evia ion 
1 /3 of total bets 2/3 of total bets 
realized realized 
Decision NOT SETS 0.473 0.5 1 6  
Theory (0. 1 23) (0. 1 1 3) 
Private PIC-4 0.295 0.284 
Information (0.096) (0. 1 06) 
PIC-2 0.269 0.290 
(0. 1 04) (0. 102) 
Proportional NOT SETS 0.473 0.5 1 6  
(0. 1 23) (0. 1 1 3) 
Allocation PIC-4 0.276 0.33 1 
(0. 105) (0.086) 
PIC-2 0.286 0.344 
(0.09 1 )  (0.09 1 )  
Competitive NOT SETS 0.566 0.6 1 3  
Equilibrium (0. 1 1 3) (0. 108) 
Private PIC-4 0.275 0.342 
Information (0. 1 20) (0.083) 
PIC-2 0.3 1 1  0.369 
(0.092) (0.095) 
Competitive NOT SETS 0.464 0.367 
Equilibrium (0.29 1 )  (0.284) 
Rational PIC-4 0.6 19  0.506 
Expectations (0.206) (0.209) 
PIC-2 0.553 0.473 
(0. 1 75) (0. 172) 
overall 
0.523 




(0. 1 03) 
0.523 
(0. 1 03) 
0.332 















Table 1 6: Average Maximum Implicit Price for Selected Time Periods . 
1 /3 of total bets 2/3 of total bets 
realized realized 
overall 
•-·--··�·�-·- �-··------·-·�----• �··•,.•�-·-·-�--••••�--•••-••�-••••m•n••••••••-••• .,.,�-·••••mm .. m•••••••••,.•••••••••••••-•••••-•••-•••••••n-m•••••••••"•' ·-••••••••mm•-••••"''-'m•-•••••••••n>mm>•••••n••----•m-•••••••• 
NOT SETS 0.675 0.725 0.744 
PIC-4 0.446 0.5 15  0.528 
PIC-2 0.442 0.5 15  0.540 
T bl 1 7  A a e verage M' . m1mum I l '  ' t  P . f S 1 t d T mp 1c1 nee or e ec e 1me p . d eno s.  
I /3 of total bets 2/3 of total bets overall 
realized realized 
NOT SETS 0.010  0.006 0.005 
-- ··--·�···� ·-· ·M--�---·�--�·---···-··-·-··-
PIC-4 0.064 0.04 1 0.034 
. .  ·-· --- · -·-��-·-���----�-��·-··-·· 
PIC-2 0.044 0.034 0.03 1 
Table 1 8 :  Average Wurtz measure of distance from market prices from AIA 
a t f d . . d vanous 1mes urmg peno s .  
1/3 of gross tickets 213 of gross tickets overall 
sales realized sales realized 
Period 1 7, 061 996 0.906 0.856 0.843 
·- - -- �-�····��-· -�----��-·-·-----·····�---��······-
Period 1 8 ,  06 1 996 0.764 0.6 1 2  0.462 
FIGURE 1 :  Timing of actions 
All markets are 
opened 
simultaneously. 





distributed to agents . 
Agents record the 
information. 
Agents free to purchase tickets in 
all markets while markets are 
open. Total purchases and odds 
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